the level of formal politics-that is to say, in the world of party political rhetoric and the implementation and selling of government policy; yet the significant push comes from politicians who often do not, themselves, have strong -or any -religious commitments. Over the last fifteen years, Australians have experienced unusually frequent political appeals to 'Christian values' and the idea of Australia as a 'Christian nation, ' pitched to voters who overwhelmingly lack specific religious commitments but for whom an ambiguous (and necessarily vague) Christian rhetoric appeals not despite, but because of the bulk of the population's distance from religious enculturation.
The fine-grained and interacting effects are easily missed if the interpretation is limited to statistical analysis of declining church attendance measured against, say, rising numbers of mentions of God in political contexts. Such statistical data are available, but they take us only a little way towards the more interesting question of causation. To find out why God's political profile is growing in Australia while her worship declines, we turn to a range of qualitative methods, including media analysis and analysis of politicians' statements and personal declarations. To account for this phenomenon requires marshalling an assemblage of characteristics as diverse as the nation's religious and political culture, the continuing sensitivity to certain incidents in recent political history and features of the federal voting system which cause aspects of electoral politics to play out in unusual ways.
Public Religion and Secularisation
Casanova (1994) argued that the essential feature of secularisation in modernity, whether or not church attendance fell, was differentiation, so that religion ceased to occupy the formal public role epitomised in caesaropapism, becoming instead a collection of voluntary organisations among the many competing for citizens' attention. Casanova puts forward as his 'central thesis and main theoretical premise' that secularisation is not unitary, but, rather: what usually passes for a single theory of secularization is actually made up of three very different, uneven and unintegrated propositions: secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere. (1994: 211) 
